Reforming the banks in the UK : an impact assessment of the draft bill and alternative capital requirements by De Feo, Giuseppe & Løland, Henriette Elisabeth Bauge
Strathprints Institutional Repository
De Feo, Giuseppe and Løland, Henriette Elisabeth Bauge (2012) Reforming the banks in the UK
: an impact assessment of the draft bill and alternative capital requirements. Fraser of Allander
Economic Commentary, 36 (2). pp. 83-91. ISSN 2046-5378
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reforming the banks in the UK. An 
impact assessment of the draft Bill 
and alternative capital requirements. 
 
 
Giuseppe De Feo, University of Strathclyde 
Henriette Elisabeth Bauge, LølandUniversità degli Studi di Pavia 
 
Introduction 
On Friday, 12 October 2012 the UK Government published a draft of the banking reform bill in order to 
implement  “key elements”  of  the  recommendations  put  forward  by  the  Independent  Commission  on 
Banking  (henceforth  ICB)  led  by  Sir  John  Vickers.  This  is  the  first  piece  of  legislation  revising  the 
regulation of the financial sector. Banks will be required to comply fully with ICB recommendations by 
2019. 
 
The crisis impacted strongly on the financial sector in Britain where the current level of employment in the 
industry is far from its peaks in 2007-8. In Scotland, in particular, employment in financial services fell from 
105,300 (9.29% of industry total in the UK) in 2008 to 84,400 (7.90%) in 2011.
1 
Furthermore, the collapse 
of some major banks and the consequent government intervention has increased the share of what is 
formally defined in the statistics as public sector employment in financial services from a mere 1.40% in 
2008 to 19.65% in 2011. In Scotland this is even more evident given that the share of public sector 
employment in financial services has increased from 2.09% in 2008 to 37.15% in 2011. 
 
If the industry has been hit harshly, the public finance has been affected even more. The government 
intervention in the aftermath of the crisis has taken the form of bank recapitalisation, credit guarantees, 
special liquidity scheme, and asset protection scheme. The first one has been the most expensive by far, 
with the government buying shares in troubled banks and currently holding shares in RBS and Lloyds. The 
total investment has been of £20,313 million in Lloyds (whose value at 31 March 2012 was just £9,278m) 
and of £45,527 million in RBS (worth £25,054m at 31 March 2012). Northern Rock was also in public 
ownership since February 2008 when the government injected £1,400m in the bank. After splitting the 
company in two, the “good one” was sold for £747 million to Virgin Money on 1 January 2012, while the 
“bad” one is now managed by UK Asset Resolution (UKAR). Bradford & Bingley was also brought into 
public ownership in 2008 and, after selling its branch network and retail deposit accounts to Santander, it 
is currently managed by the UKAR. The aim is to run down their closed mortgage books and to pay back 
the Government loan, which on 31 December 2012 was £46,582m.
2  
Differently from bank capitalisation, 
the other forms of government interventions provide guarantee, liquidity or insurance to banks, which pay 
fees for such services. Finally, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which provides insurance to 
bank depositors, ran out of cash in 2008/9 because it had to step in to compensate more than 4 million 
depositors of six financial institutions, which defaulted that year.
3 
It borrowed from the government which 
receives interest payments for this loan. 
 
However financial services remain a strong contributor to the UK economy. They account for more than 
10% of the Gross Added Value in the UK, and 9% in Scotland. 
 
It is clear therefore that the aim of the UK government is to reduce the likelihood of further financial crisis 
as well as the cost for the public purse in the event of a crisis and, at the same time, to retain the UK 
status as a global financial centre. To this end an Independent Commission on Banking (henceforth ICB), 
chaired by sir John Vickers, was appointed in June 2010 and its final report released in September 2011 
outlines a series of recommendations with the aim of 
 
1. Making banks able to absorb losses better 
2. Making it easier and less costly to sort out banks that still get into trouble 
3. Curbing incentives for excessive risk taking 
 
The  HM  Treasury  estimates  that  by  implementing  the  ICB  recommendations,  the  requirements  to 
increased capital could be met by increasing by 5 per cent the overall equity capital within the industry. 
Arguments have been made that these new capital restrictions, in that they surpass international 
requirements, might contribute to reduce competitiveness for the UK banking sector. Others have called 
for a stricter regulation to increase stability. In this regard, the aim of this research is to analyse whether 
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alterations in levels of the capital requirements in the ICB recommendations will have a substantial effect 
on the UK economy, furthermore how different levels of capital requirements might impact the stability of 
the banking sector. 
 
Data and methodology 
In the present work we use Cost Benefit Analysis to account for the impact on the UK economy of the 
proposed reform and of alternative policies including higher and lower capital requirements. We use data 
from the ICB (2011) final report, HM Treasury (2012a) white paper, and the draft of the banking reform bill 
(HM Treasury, 2012b), as well as the balance sheet of the major UK banks accounting for as much as 
50% of the total assets of the industry. 
 
The analysis includes prices and costs of private character, as well as a predicted cost of externalities. In 
the case of prices on externalities, these may be difficult to quantify since there exists no obvious market 
for them. When this is the case, we have to rely on “surrogates” prices, and use the society’s marginal 
willingness to pay for these goods (shadow prices). In reference to the present value calculations, the 
costs and benefits have been assumed to continue for the timeframe of 30 years, discounted according to 
the HM Treasury’s Green Book guidance with the discount rate of 3,5%(HM Treasury, 2003). 
 
Measuring private cost for the banks 
The HM Treasury (2012b) draft of the banking reform bill has estimated the total private costs to UK 
banks to be in the range of £2 – 5 billion annually, and with a one-off cost of transition between £1.5 and 
£2.5 billion. Implementing these requirements will lead to a higher private cost to banks in the UK.
4  
The 
estimated cost to UK banks is the sum of several effects. A portion of this cost is due to the restriction of 
the implicit government guarantee for banks which are “too big to fail” 
. 
The HM Treasury (2012b) highlights how the proposed reform is assumed to curb the perceived 
government guarantee by ring-fencing the activities vital for the economy, and making resolution easier in 
the event of insolvency.
5 
However, banks benefit from the scale in which investors assume and trust that 
the government will not to let a large bank fail. This reduces their cost of funding as investors assume the 
extent of loss is smaller than if they were to assume no implicit government guarantee. Theoretical 
evidence estimates the value of this guarantee to be in the range of £6-100 billion for UK banks (Noss and 
Sowerbutts, 2012). Therefore, as this implicit guarantee is reduced, banks funding costs are likely to 
increase as risk is transferred from the government and taxpayers back on to the investors. 
 
Implementing ring-fence is assumed to increase costs of operation and to have transition costs. There may 
be a benefits-loss of diversification in the long run, as bank’s ability to subsidise and distribute across 
borders of structural separation is restricted.   Furthermore, they are likely to be faced with upfront 
transitional costs such as forming new subsidiaries, and continuing operational costs of servicing two 
bodies rather than one (operating accounting platforms, for example). Total cost of ring fencing are 
estimated “to be in the range £1.7bn – £4.4bn per year with one-off transitional costs in the range £1.5bn – 
£2.5bn”(HM Treasury, 2012b, p.68). The estimation of the permanent increase of bank’s costs is obtained 
by adding up evaluating capital, funding, and operational costs. 
 
Based on simulations from banks, the HM Treasury (2012b) has estimated annual operational costs for 
major UK banks of an ICB implementation in the range of £100 – £300 million per bank, totalling £400 – 
£1200 million for the industry. However, it has been assumed that these costs will not incur until two years 
have passed after implementation. This assumption will also be used in the present work. 
 
Capital cost for ring fencing is estimated in the range of £1500-£3000 million per year and is the single 
most relevant private cost for the banking industry. The modelling of capital requirement increase in the 
HM Treasury (2012b) assessment is done through wide-ranging scenario estimations from large UK 
banks. On the basis of these scenario adaptions, the HM Treasury (2012b) estimated the extent of 
additional capital needed within the sector. Applying this to estimations for the yearly capital and funding 
costs, based on historical data and the evidence supplied by the UK banks, they were able to estimate 
annual capital and funding costs of ICB implementation. In this assessment their estimates for transitional 
costs, operational costs and funding costs will be used and calculated into net present value terms. The 
estimates for cost of equity will be based on current levels of equity from aggregated estimated balance 
sheets published in June 2012 in the Financial Stability Report (Bank of England, 2012). It emerges from 
the balance sheets that the total value of assets and liabilities of these banks amounts to £7600 billion, 
where equity is estimated to count for approximately 5 per cent of total liabilities. The HM Treasury has 
assessed the needed increase for equity capital in the industry to be roughly £19 billion, which amount to 5 
per cent, with the BoE balance sheet estimates. The cost of equity capital is valued to a high and low cost 
of roughly 16 and 8 per cent with a long –run historical average cost of equity to banks of 11.5 per cent 
(Bank of England, 2012). 
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Funding costs are estimated to be almost negligible or even negative, with an estimation between –£200 
and +£200 million. In fact, expectations are that funding costs for ring-fenced banks would fall with the 
reform, while, funding costs would increase for non-ring-fenced banks. 
 
Operational costs are due to restructuring to comply with the new regulation and it may vary from bank to 
bank, depending on their business structure. The HM Treasury has assumed the cost to vary from £50- 
500 million per bank, and on aggregate this has been estimate in the range of £400-£1.200 million per 
year. 
 
Finally the bill proposes to give preference to FSCS-insured deposits in the event of insolvency. Therefore 
this will increase the risk for other senior creditors that in turn will demand a higher risk premium for their 
funds. The HM Treasury (2012b) estimate the annual cost for the financial sector of depositor preference 
cost in the range 300-700 million per year. The following table summarizes the private cost hypothesis 
outlined in HM Treasury (2012b). 
 
Table 1. Private costs estimated in HM Treasury (2012b) in £million. 
 
 Min Max Ave 
Capital costs 1500 3000 2250 
operational costs 400 1200 800 
funding costs -200 200 0 
Total ring fencing costs 1700 4400 3050 
Depositors preference costs 300 700 500 
Total annual private costs 2000 5100 3550 
one-off transitional costs 1500 2500 2000 
 
Measuring the external effect of changes in regulation 
The increased private costs to banks are transferred over to the investors, employees and customers 
through reduced returns, lower pay and increased prices. The effect on consumption, investment and GDP 
is thus dependent on how these increased costs feed through. 
Having estimated the costs to private UK banks, the HM Treasury (2012b) projects the impact of these 
costs on UK GDP by applying the FSA methodology.
6
 
 
The HM Treasury (2012b) estimated that the increase in banks private costs produce a gross reduction 
in GDP of £400-£1120 million per year. In the impact assessment developed in the present paper we 
measure the ratio between the change in GDP and the private cost estimated by the HM Treasury (2012b) 
and assume that it increases with some measure of private cost. The ratio relative to the proposed reform 
in the draft bill is 0.20, meaning that the private cost to the banking system is larger than the overall social 
cost; this can be explained by the fact that some of the private costs are simply transfers between 
consumers (and other economic agents) and banks. This is the main reason why the total cost for society 
is lower than the private cost to banks. However, when the private cost increases we assume that the 
possibility of offsetting such costs is reduced and the ratio increases. 
 
It is also interesting to evaluate the effect of the reform on public finance. In the draft of the banking reform 
bill, HM Treasury estimates that tax revenues will suffer a reduction in the range of £150m-£400m per 
annum.
7 
This results from the application of the long-run tax-to-GDP ratio, which for the UK has been 35.2 
per cent over the last 20 years. A further cost of the reform will arise from the impact on the value of 
government’s shares in RBS and Lloyds, which is estimated in the range of £2-£5bn.
8
 
 
Obviously the government strongly believes that the reform will have large benefits for the society. The 
HM Treasury (2012) has in fact estimated that the implementation of the recommendations set out by the 
ICB may lead to an annually increase in GDP of £2000 – £9500 million. In the draft of the banking reform 
bill (HM Treasury, 2012b) the average benefit of introducing the provisions included in the bill are estimate 
in 0.47 per cent of UK GDP, which in 2010/11 terms amounts to £6900 million.
9
 
 
The modelling of these benefits is based on assumptions about the effect of the reform on the probability 
and cost of future financial crises. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) compared 
academic research and collected historic estimates for costs to GDP and the probability of previous 
financial crises. The present value cost estimates to GDP in the occurrence of a crisis hits values ranging 
from 16 per cent to 302 per cent of GDP (HM Treasury, 2012) with an average of 63% of GDP. The range 
is very large due to the presence of permanent and non-permanent effects, and to the difficulty of 
quantifying rare events of large impact. The probability for a crisis to occur in any given year ranges from 
3.5 per cent to 5.2 per cent with an average of 4.5% as computed by ICB (2011). Subsequently, the costs 
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to the UK economy of a financial crisis are substantial, around 3 per cent of GDP or £40000 million in 
terms of 2010 GDP (HM Treasury, 2012). The benefit of regulation arises from a reduction in the likelihood 
and/or magnitude of financial crises. Using ICB (2011) estimation, HM Treasury (2012) quantifies the 
effect of introducing the new banking regulation. It first of all recognizes the positive effect of reforms 
already in place, which are likely to have reduced the probability of other financial crisis by 30 per cent, 
while the measures proposed in the bill are supposed to reduce the probability of the crises by a further 
10% and the cost of such an event by 15 per cent. Under such assumptions the benefit of the bill in terms 
of reduced expected cost of further crisis is estimated to be around £6580m per year.
10
 
 
Data quality 
The majority of data is accumulated from the Bank of England, the HM Treasury and the Independent 
Commission on Banking. The data are estimated based on 2010/11 GDP while the base year for the net 
present value computation is 2019, when the provisions of the bill will be fully implemented. The estimates 
count for the major banks in the UK including Banco Santander, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Co-operative 
Banking Group, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group(LBG), National Australian Bank, Nationwide, Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), and Virgin Money (BoE June report 2012). The major banks amount to approximately 50 
per cent of the total industry. This might not give a full representation of the UK industry, but should 
represent the major implications of costs and benefits the industry are likely to face when the new 
regulation is implemented. Furthermore, the requirements proposed by the ICB differentiates between 
ring-fenced and non-ring fenced institutions in reference to capital requirements. As this analysis is 
estimated on aggregated data for major UK banks, this distinction has not been done. 
 
The Impact Assessment 
In the present work the costs and benefits of implementing ICB policy recommendations are estimated 
using different levels of capital requirements. The assessment will examine the impact of the ICB 
suggestions on loss-absorbency, structural separation and competitiveness with a main emphasis on 
capital requirements. The HM Treasury has calculated that, in order to comply with ICB policy suggestion, 
the banking industry as a whole has to increase the equity capital by 5 per cent. In the present paper we 
will also consider alternative policy options with a stricter and looser version of these capital requirements, 
of respectively 20 and 1 per cent increase in equity capital and to compare them in terms of efficiency. We 
therefore compare the following alternative options: 
 
1. Do not implement recommended regulation alternative proposed by the ICB; 
2. Implement the recommended regulations included in the draft bill published by the Government 
which implements key elements of the ICB recommendations and include a 5 per cent increase in 
Tier 1 Equity Capital; 
3. Implement  the  recommended  alternative  proposed  by  the  ICB,  however  with  loser  capital 
requirements defined as a 1 per cent increase in Tier 1 Equity Capital; 
4. Implement the recommended regulation alternative proposed by the ICB, however with stricter 
capital requirements defined as a 20 per cent increase in Tier 1 Equity Capital; 
 
In what follows a Cost-Benefit Analysis in terms of social surplus or GDP is developed. The first policy 
option has zero costs and zero benefits, thus does not contribute to any changes in the regulatory 
environment and has no effects on the overall economy. This is the baseline for comparison of the 
alternative policies analysed below. 
 
Effects on the industry 
The differences in costs to banks for the policy options derive only from the different costs of equity capital 
associated with different levels of equity. The costs associated with transition, operation, funding and the 
restraint of the implicit government guarantee are assumed constant and independent of differences in 
capital requirements. 
 
Martinez-Miera (2009) estimated the role capital requirements have on the probability of failure for 
individual banks. His analysis suggested that there does exist a clear relationship in this, however, the 
relationship is stronger when banks are poorly capitalised. Their analysis also showed some trends of 
increased risk of failure to banks when requirements are substantially high (by higher than the 20 per cent 
analysed in this work). 
 
In Table 2 we provide a lower bound, an upper bound, and the average estimated effect of the different 
policy option on the annual private cost for the firms.  In addition to those cost there is a one-off transitional 
cost estimated by HM Treasury (2012b) in the rage of £1500m - £2500m. 
 
An implementation of increased capital ratios  for the banking sector indicates  an increased level of 
leverage ratios in the overall industry. The current level of the leverage ratio is 3.3 per cent, estimated from 
core capital to tangible assets, and the Tier 1 Capital Ratio is 8.3 per cent. Increasing the equity level in 
banks with 5 per cent induces a growth in the Tier 1 Capital Ratio of 0.42 per cent to 8.72 per cent and an 
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improved leverage ratio of 3.5 per cent. Using loser capital requirements has a minor effect on both, 
improving the Tier 1 Capital Ratio with 0.08 per cent and the leverage ratio with 0.03 per cent. However, 
tightening the capital requirements result in a boost to the Tier 1 Capital Ratio of 1.66 per cent and an 
increase in the leverage ratio of 0.63 per cent.   Analyzing this in the light of Martinez-Miera (2009) 
suggests that capital requirements actually could be increased even further without increasing the risk of 
failure to individual banks substantially. 
 
Table 2: Private annual cost comparison of the different policy options. 
 
 option 2 option 3 option 4 
 Min Max Ave Min Max Ave Min Max Ave 
Capital costs 1520 3040 2280 304 608 456 6080 12160 9120 
operational costs 400 1200 800 400 1200 800 400 1200 800 
funding costs -200 200 0 -200 200 0 -200 200 0 
Total ring fencing 
costs 
 
1720 
 
4440 
 
3080 
 
504 
 
2008 
 
1256 
 
6280 
 
13560 
 
9920 
Depositors 
preference costs 
 
300 
 
700 
 
500 
 
300 
 
700 
 
500 
 
300 
 
700 
 
500 
Total  annual  private 
costs 
 
2020 
 
5140 
 
3580 
 
804 
 
2708 
 
1756 
 
6580 
 
14260 
 
10420 
 
An illustrative calculation suggests that banks have substantial capacity to raise additional equity capital. If 
banks could get an average return on equity (ROE) of approximately 10 per cent, and distributed 70 per 
cent of this to shareholders, the bank would be able to grow their equity capital at a rate of 3 per cent per 
annum, not taking increased taxation costs into account. Furthermore, over a period of 5 years this should 
raise approximately an additional equity of 15 per cent. However, if they were to reduce the amount of 
dividends paid out on ROE, banks could raise even more new Equity through retained earnings. (HM 
Treasury, 2012). 
 
It would seem that the most implicit argumentation for this new regulation is to deal with the problems of 
moral hazard within the industry. One of the greater critics of new regulation has been in reference to how 
this might affect the lending channel in the economy. Concern has been raised in regards to whether and 
how the increased costs of capital to banks  might reduce banks issuance of lending to the overall 
economy. There is little doubt in the increase of private costs related to this regulation. 
 
New policy recommendations seem focused on behavioural and incentive driven effects of the regulation. 
Parts  of the sought  effect of new policies  are  to curb banks  and managers  incentives  to  be  more 
concerned with the risk of potential investments and not just the high return of the investment. The cost 
associated with restricting the implicit government guarantee, it is argued, is a cost that has been avoided 
from the banks side. Research including the Financial Stability Commission’s (FSC) and of the BoE show 
that the increased costs that would transpire with restraining the implicit government guarantee, are costs 
that have always been there, but have been minimised in that risk has been borne by others rather than 
the banks themselves, implicitly making funding and capital cheaper. 
 
Admati et al (2010a) has challenged the benefits associated with debt versus equity financing, exploring 
the link between taxation benefits for debt financing through reduced tax-receipt payments. Banks pay out 
lower tax when the level of equity is small, increasing debt as means of finance at the expense of equity 
actually increases their return on equity. Banks as other business are concerned with their return on equity 
as this often encourages new investors. Making debt financing a “cheaper” alternative for banks, might 
feed through to their incentive for additional risk taking in that brokers and managers often earn a lot when 
their trades show good results, however, losses associated with their transaction are usually limited. Due 
to the asymmetry in the nature of their return, there is an incentive to take riskier positions to increase own 
compensation (French, et al., 2010). Such bias to select an excessively risky strategy, with a payment 
obligation that is independent of the bank’s asset returns, creates incentives for the bank’s shareholders, 
or for its managers, to take on increased risks (Admati, et al., 2010). Therefore, by reducing (if not 
removing) the implicit government guarantee and restricting balance sheets by increasing equity to debt 
financing would limit the incentives to excessive risky strategies. 
 
Effects on the overall economy 
The implementation of the ICB recommendations is aimed at the creation of a more stable banking 
industry, thus limiting negative spill-over effects. However, it is important that banks building of resilience 
should not come at the expense of the real economy. The argument that the key benefit of the policy 
implementation is greater financial stability, which in turn would contribute to a higher level of expected 
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and average GDP in the future, indicates a large payoff of avoiding financial crises. Financial crises, as 
resent times have shown, are very costly to the overall economy. As a consequence, the benefit of 
financial stability should be high. 
 
GDP costs associated with the implementation of new regulation are spill-over effects from the increased 
private costs projected to banks. However, these costs are assumed to be lessened through the spill-over 
process, and are generally smaller than the private costs. In Table 3 we provide the estimation of annual 
cost in terms of GDP of the different policy options under scrutiny. We make the assumption that the spill- 
over increases as the private cost increases, that is, the larger the cost for banks, the larger is the negative 
effect on social surplus, as a larger part of the private cost is not offset in the economy.
11
 
 
Table 3: Estimation on the annual effect on GDP of the total annual private cost presented in Table 2. 
 
 
reform option 2 option 3 option 4 
spill-over on GDP: 20.00% 15.20% 95.00% 
 Min Max Ave Min Max Ave Min Max Ave 
total annual social cost 404 1028 716 122 412 267 6251 13547 9899 
 
Implementation of new regulation is expected to accumulate a loss to GDP, as cost are assumed to be 
transferred through the channels going from the banks and over to the overall economy. The short-term 
risks to the economy of these implementations are that banks could respond to new regulations by 
shrinking their balance sheets and cutting back on lending to the economy. This would transfer loss to 
investment and consumption values in the economy, which could induce effects on employment levels and 
inflation. 
 
Passing on costs to customers can happen through increased interest margins or stricter lending criteria. 
Increasing interest rates or tightening lending will feed over to the economy through reduced spending by 
businesses and households. This may, in the short run, reduce consumption and investment spending. 
Furthermore, effects could be increased if the implementation of new regulation and the transfer of the 
increased private costs to banks would incline a reduction in asset prices used as collateral for bank 
lending. 
 
Although  new requirements  do  induce  increased costs  to  banks,  growing  capital  can  increase  their 
capacity and ability to lend as well. Furthermore, if this capital is used to build bigger “loss absorbency 
cushions” it may also reduce funding costs when increased levels of capital are obtained, as the 
relationship between capital and lending are closely linked. 
 
The overall effect on the economy will also be influenced by the behavioural response of customers. If 
there is a shift in the credit demand, from classical banking markets to markets of non-bank financial 
intermediation the effects of the new regulation might be smaller. In this scenario banks have to internalise 
a larger amount of their increased costs, which could happen through a reduction in cost of employment by 
a cut in pay or jobs.  Furthermore, the main impact would then fall on bank-dependant sectors such as 
households and SMEs, as the larger corporations might have the opportunity to obtain their funding from 
other sources. This would likely induce increased weight again on the more vulnerable participants in the 
economy in which new policy is estimated to protect, however through another channel than tax-payer 
funded bail-outs. 
 
A reduction in GDP growth and a downwards pressure on prices and wages would under normal 
assumptions be expected to lead to a monetary policy response. The effects of the reduction in inflation 
and GDP growth are likely to be countered by the central bank, with the aim to reduce these effects of the 
implemented policy. 
 
Tightening the capital requirements above international regulation recommendations, e.g. Basel III, has 
been one of the major issues of banks. Their argument goes, that increasing requirements above 
international standards is likely to reduce banks competitiveness against international counterparts. In the 
long-run, however, by making banks more stable and curtailing the perceived implicit government 
guarantee, implementing the ICB recommendations is expected to support a more sufficient supply of 
credit to the economy. To mitigate initial challenges banks are permitted an extended time period to 
comply with the regulations, starting in 2019. 
 
On the other side, the new policy is implemented in order to reduce the likelihood and the size of future 
financial crisis. As already mentioned above, the expected costs to the UK economy of a financial crisis 
have been estimated in the order of magnitude of £40000 million in terms of 2010 GDP. The benefit of the 
regulation arises from a reduction in the likelihood and/or magnitude of the financial crises. Given that 
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reforms already in place are likely to have reduced the probability of other financial crisis by 30 per cent, 
HM Treasury (2012b) estimated that the proposed bill is likely to reduce the probability of the crises by a 
further 10% and the cost of such an occurrence by 15 per cent. We keep the latter estimation constant for 
all the policy options as it is more likely to be linked to the ring-fencing strategy, rather than to the 
magnitude of capital requirements. On the contrary, we assume that the capital requirements linearly affect 
the probability of a crisis. Under such assumptions the annual benefit of option 2 (the bill) is estimated to 
be £6580m on average, while the benefit of option 3 is £4676m and £13720m for option 4. 
 
Table 4: Estimated annual benefit of the different policy options. 
 
 option 2 option 3 option 4 
annual expected cost of a financial crisis (£m) 40000 40000 40000 
annual expected cost of a financial crisis after policies 
already implemented (£m) 
 
28000 
 
28000 
 
28000 
estimated reduction in probability of crises 10.00% 2.00% 40.00% 
estimated reduction in cost of crises 15.00% 15.00% 15.00% 
estimated benefit of the reform 6580 4676 13720 
 
Now we have all the data needed to compute the net present value of the different policy options. Table 5 
summarizes the results under the assumptions of 3.5 discount rate and 30-year time horizon which have 
been used in HM Treasury (2012). 
 
Table 5: Present value of social benefits and costs associated with the different policy option presented. 
 
 estimated benefit estimated cost net estimated benefit 
option 2 125255 15630 109626 
option 3 89011 7081 81930 
option 4 261171 190435 70736 
 
The policy option proposed in the bill has the highest net estimated benefit. However this result is very 
sensitive to the assumptions made on spill-over costs on GDP and on the reduction of the likelihood of the 
crises. In fact, with assumptions very much in line with those of HM Treasury (2012b) and ICB (2011), it is 
likely that policy alternative with a larger capital requirement may have higher present value benefit than 
the one included in the proposed bill. Furthermore, it could be assumed that the size of the private costs 
that feed over to the GDP, thus the overall economy were larger. Estimations would suggest that doubling 
this effect still produces a positive result of policy implementation for all levels of increased equity. 
 
One should however not forget the main limitation of the analysis presented here. There might be, in fact, 
cost effects associated with different levels of requirements which is not measured here since behavioural 
responses in this are not accounted for. Furthermore, it does not include any potential accumulated market 
effects which may occur in the wake of implementation of financial regulation. The analysis considers that 
the amounts of capital needed to meet new regulation are available to banks in the market. Finally, all 
costs and benefits are estimates of aggregated values. Since the model is static, this does not necessarily 
converse accurately to reality. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the impact assessment suggest a positive impact of new regulation, should it be 
implemented.  There have been arguments made for both stricter and looser capital requirements of new 
regulation. The arguments for stricter requirements are based on increasing stability even further and 
curbing risk incentives. Through a diminished level of risk in the institutions, it has been assumed that bank 
managers and shareholders are more concerned with the riskiness of their investments and lending if 
more of their funding is based on equity, and the institutions themselves has to bear losses in the 
occurrence of a bad investment. The argument for looser capital restrictions is based on that 
implementation of high capital restrictions, above international level, might infer higher costs which can 
induce a reduction in lending and competitiveness to the UK banking industry. 
 
From a social point of view the benefits of implementing these capital requirements are estimated to be 
much larger in comparison to the associated costs and this result still holds when considering policy 
options with both smaller and larger capital requirements. 
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Barrel et al.(2010) investigated the role of capital and liquidity standards in the sub-prime crises, and claim 
that if capital standards had been roughly 4 percentage points of total assets higher, over the last 15 
years, the sub-prime crises might well have been avoided. The impact assessment developed in the 
present work is based on the intuition that larger capital requirements reduce the probability of crises. 
 
One thing to be noted is that the current levels of the leverage ratio in the aggregated values of the 
industry is in 2011 estimates, are equal to or slightly above the recommended level of the leverage ratio 
proposed by the new regulatory requirements. Since these numbers is an overall estimate, it is noted that 
this does not necessarily indicate sufficient levels of Tier 1 Capital within each bank. The Bank of England 
estimated in their Financial Stability Report published in June, that recent changes in leverage were mainly 
due to a reduction in risk-weighted assets, and not an increase in equity capital (Bank of England, 2012). 
Although, a reduction in risk-weighted assets may contribute to a more stable financial system, increased 
equity capital should contribute to this as well as maintaining the vital services of the system in which the 
economy depends. The increase in the leverage ratio, thus the reduction of leverage in the sector as a 
whole, should indicate an increased level of stability within the sector. This is due to that institutions with 
these increased levels of equity should be better able to absorb losses, give the institutions desired rating 
by agencies which able the banks to maintain their activities. The average current level of Core Tier 1 
Equity Capital seems to be in lines with the regulatory suggestions. However, as this analysis take count 
for the aggregated results, levels for individual institutions might differ. Increasing capital requirements has 
substantial effects on banks private costs, however, these costs also depend on the cost of capital in the 
market. 
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1 The data are gathered from the Office of National Statistics, Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) 2008 and 2011. 
2 This information are provided by the UK Financial Investments Ltd annual report and accounts 2011/12 presented to the house of Commons on 
3 July 2012 
3  Five banks (Bradford & Bingley, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander, Heritable Bank, Landsbanki Islands, London Scottish Bank) and one building 
society (Dunfermline Building Society defaulted in 2008/9. 
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4 In the assessment supporting the white paper the figure were different, with an implementation cost for the banks of £2,500m and an annual cost of 
£4000m - £7000m per annum. So, both the transitional cost, and the annual cost has been adjusted downward in the latest HM Treasury 
estimates. 
5 There have already been made some actions to restrict this perceived guarantee. The Special Resolution Regime has implicitly signalled to the 
sector that they cannot again expect benefits from bail-outs funded by tax payers to the same extent as before. 
6  The FSA uses the NiGEM model, which is an empirically based model that can be used to assess the impact of changes to banks minimum 
capital ratios, funding and operating costs on capital prices and economic output. The model utilises long-term historical data to determine impacts 
on the overall economy of changes to banks costs. The NiGEM model estimates costs to GDP on the basis that banks pass on a high level of 
increased cost to the overall economy. If this notion is made this would imply that the actual costs affecting the bank’s balance sheets and profits 
are smaller than what initially would be estimated as the direct costs to the industry (HM Treasury, 2012).  It is recognised that using historical 
evidence may not give a true reflection of future trends; this would suggest that the actual spill-over effects might deviate from the estimate 
assumed in this paper. 
7 The previous estimate published in HM Treasury (2012) was of a gross reduction in tax receipts of £200-500 million annually. 
8 As for previous cases this estimation is less pessimistic than the one in HM Treasury (2012) which was £6-£9 billion. 
9  All the changes from the white paper estimations (HM Treasury, 2012) published in June and the draft of the reform bill (HM Treasury 2012b) 
published in October are in the direction of lower costs and higher benefits. 
10 This number comes from a direct application of the assumptions put forward in HM Treasury (2012b). However, in the text these are reported to be 
slightly higher (£6900m) but we have not been able to replicate this exact number. We rely on our computation for consistency with other 
estimates. 
11  We use the following spill-over function  where CR is the increase in capital requirement as a fraction of total liabilities of the 
banks, and a and b are calibrated so to fit the HM treasury estimations for policy option 1. 
 
 
 
